媒体称中央军委不允许海军控制核弹 只是面子工程

新加坡媒体《海峡时报》6月4日发表署名文章《棘手问题制约中国潜艇战略》，分析中国新型“晋”级战略核潜艇以及“巨浪-2”型弹道导弹若要转化为打击能力机会渺茫，在控制方面中央军委不会允许海军控制核潜艇携带核弹，加之巨浪-2射程不及美国本土，核潜艇亦无法轻易突入太平洋深处，这一搭配只能沦为一种“面子工程”。7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语

解放军于20世纪80年代下水“夏”级弹道导弹核潜艇。但航速缓慢、噪音偏大、性能不稳定的“夏”级极易受到攻击。文章称，为解决这些问题，中国推出新型“晋”级战略核潜艇和“巨浪-2”型弹道导弹。目前已有两艘“晋”级交付使用，至少还有两艘在建。然而，要想将这些资产转化为二次打击能力，北京至少还面临两个重大问题。一是技术问题，二是更严肃的政治问题。7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语

技术方面包括通信能力。五角大楼两年前出台的报告称，解放军海上潜艇通信能力有限，也无管理执行战略巡航任务的核潜艇舰队的经验。简言之，中国的潜艇在海下潜航时无法与总部进行通信联系。它们需浮出水面或放出通信浮标，这两种做法会令其易于被发现和遭攻击。一名熟悉该领域的人士表示，解决这个问题不容易，但最终会被克服。但在此之前，解放军甚至无法有效训练核潜艇进行战略巡逻。7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语

该人士表示，另一方面还存在命令控制问题，即政治约束。陆基系统是中国核武库的主要组成部分，弹头和导弹被分离存放。它们受到高度集中体系的控制，从中央军委到中央政治局，再到总参谋部和二炮总部，最后才是承担发射责任的战斗部队。而核潜艇巡逻需同时装备弹头和导弹。关键决策权力应掌握在海军军官手中，这是北京从不允许的。7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语

美国科学家联合会核信息项目主管汉斯·克里斯滕森说：“若要在海上部署二次打击能力，北京须对核政策和实践做出重大调整。”7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语

他说：“中央军委还需解决如何保持对海上核潜艇的命令控制等复杂问题。即便假定在危机时刻，中国领导人把核弹头发放给海军，但部署核武会引发诸多棘手问题，如在潜艇失踪或无法取得联系的情况下如何应对危机，北京是否会认为潜艇已沉没并视之为中国受袭的信号，由此动用核武?”7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语

此外，“巨浪-2”预计射程7400公里，这意味著它无法从中国沿海打到美国大陆。核潜艇须成功穿过数个遏制点，航行至开放的太平洋地区，这并非易事。7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语

鉴于上述考虑，消息人士表示，新核潜艇可能至多为中国提供某种程度的战略模煳。克里斯滕森则认为，它们是“面子工程”，“中国可能把核报复能力集中在(移动)陆基导弹上，它们可被隐匿在中国广袤的大地上。”7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语

Singapore media, "The Straits Times, June 4 published a signed article" thorny issue restricting China's submarine strategy, analysis of China's new Jin-class strategic nuclear submarine, and the JL-2 ballistic missile to into combat ability is little chance that in the control of the Central Military Commission will not allow the Navy control of nuclear submarines to carry nuclear bombs, combined with the JL-2 range is less than the United States, nuclear submarines can not be easily broke into the deep Pacific, this match can only become a "vanity project".7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
People's Liberation Army in the 1980s, launching the "Summer" class ballistic missile submarine. But the speed is slow, the noise is too large, unstable performance "summer" class vulnerable to attack. The article said that to solve these problems, China has introduced the new Jin-class strategic nuclear submarine, and the JL-2 ballistic missile. There are two Jin-class delivery, there are at least two under construction. However, in order to translate these assets into the second-strike capability, Beijing also faces at least two major issues. Technical problems, the second is a more serious political issue.7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
Technical aspects, including communication capabilities. Pentagon two years ago introduced the report, the People's Liberation Army at sea submarine communications capabilities are limited, and no experience in the nuclear submarine fleet management implementation strategy for patrol. In short, the Chinese submarine submerged under the sea can not be with the headquarters communications link. They need to surface or release communications buoy, will make it easy to these two approaches was found and was attacked. One familiar with the field said that to solve this problem is not easy, but it will eventually be overcome. Prior to this, the PLA can not even training nuclear submarines for strategic patrol.7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
The source said, on the other hand there is the command control problems, ie political constraints. The ground-based systems is a major component of China's nuclear arsenal, warheads and missiles are separate store. By a highly centralized system of control to the Central Political Bureau of the Central Military Commission, to the General Staff and the Second Artillery headquarters, and finally assume the emission responsibility for combat troops. Nuclear submarine patrols required at the same time equipped with warheads and missiles. Key decision-making power lies in the hands of a naval officer, which is Beijing from not allowed.7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
Hans Kristensen, director of the U.S. Union of Concerned Scientists Nuclear Information Project, said: "To be deployed at sea, the second-strike capability, Beijing must make major adjustments to nuclear policy and practice."7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
The Central Military Commission needs to address how to maintain command and control complex issues such as nuclear submarines at sea. Assume that even in times of crisis, Chinese leaders have nuclear warheads issued to the Navy, but the deployment of nuclear weapons will lead to a number of thorny issues, such as the missing submarine, he said: unable to get in touch with how to deal with a crisis, whether Beijing would think that the submarine has sunk and is seen as the Chinese attacked the signals, which use nuclear weapons? "7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
In addition, the JL-2 is expected to range of 7400 km from China's coastal areas, which means it can not hit the U.S. mainland. The nuclear submarine to be successful through a number of containment, sailing to the open Pacific region, which is not easy.7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语
Given the above considerations, the sources said, the new nuclear submarines may at most provide some degree of strategic mode burnt. Christensen believes that they are "vanity project", "China may be the nuclear retaliatory capacity concentrated in the (mobile) land-based missiles, they can be hidden in the vast earth."7P3Rainbow Mandarin 彩虹汉语